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Recent social spending inflation in China has led to its growth rate far exceeding 
that of income and other consumption. In this paper, we estimate private returns to 
social spending, such as higher social status and larger social network that serve as 
certain functions. In almost all specifications we find that gift spending has significant 
private returns, but the returns are biased towards richer households. Upon comparing 
different measures of centrality, we also find that social connections are more 
accurately characterized when weighted by their intensities (values), capturing their role 
in mobilizing scarce resource in the network. Furthermore, social status and network 
may change long-term income trajectory and the resulted consumption. However, our 
findings do not suggest that they are vehicles through which they could facilitate 
smoother consumption against shocks. The result does not depend on how 
heterogeneous the shocks are. 
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“Every exchange as it embodies some coefficient of sociability cannot be understood in 
its material terms apart from its social terms.” – Marshall Sahlins, 1972 
 
1. Introduction 
In recent years China has experienced drastic inflation of social spending (see a 
cross-country comparison in Figure 1 that includes China), and its growth rate far 
exceeds the growth rates of income and other consumption (see the case of rural 
Guizhou in Figure 2 as an example). Escalating social spending is regarded as individually 
rational but collectively irrational. While previous studies on social spending and relative 
concern generally focus on collective irrationality,
1 only a few studies try to understand 
individual rationality, i.e. the returns to social spending from household perspective. For 
instance, while Chwe (1998) provides insights into the mechanism through which social 
ceremonies solve coordination problems by generating common knowledge and 
conveying information, there is no microeconomic foundation of the social behavior. 
Further explanations are needed to understand why poor households devote more and 
more resources on such social events. 
Sociologist Turner (1982) describes festivals as a way to improve social cohesion by 
reinforcing ties within a community. That not mentioned is that by signaling individual 
commitments and reciprocity to people around, the features of this public good might 
go beyond pure entertainment and social harmony. To understand the logic behind, a 
branch of relevant literature on social capital treat social spending in ceremonies as a 
crucial way to facilitate an extended social network and higher social status, which in 
turn contributes to higher economic productivity (Barr, 2000; Narayan and Pritchett, 
1999). However, the social mechanism explaining how to get access to social capital is 
still in the black box.  
                                                 
1 Evidence include designer-label goods consumption in Bolivia (Kempen, 2003), festivals’ budget in India 
(Banerjee and Duflo, 2007), “splendid” funerals in Ghana (Economist, 2007), relative deprivation and 
migration in Mexico (Stark et al., 1991), bride-prices and dowries in south Asia and Africa (Rao, 1993; 
Dekker and Hoogeveen 2002), marriage payments in Bangladesh (Anderson, 2007), and community level 
consumption in Nepal (Fafchamps and Shilpi, 2008).   - 4 - 
Rao (2001) uses both qualitative and quantitative data from a case study of three 
India villages to show that altruistic desire does not contribute to a public event. 
However, nearly all public events documented by Rao (2001) are festivals at sub-caste 
level or across caste groups that the village celebrates communally, while household 
celebrations are left untouched. 
In household ceremonies, some local residents directly contribute their culinary 
skills, the elderly in village informal committees oversee the organization of the events, 
and people dress up to socialize with others. The special clothes guests wear and food 
they bring to the ceremonies are very costly. Gift offered by guests are primarily used to 
finance ceremonies in various social occasions, ranging from wedding to funeral, from 
house-building to house-moving, and from coming-of-age to child birth (Chen, 2010). 
Before household ceremonies (except funeral
2), hosts invite people and estimate 
budget proportionally to try to make ends meet. However, ceremonies usually cost 
more than gift received, which is financed by their own savings. 
From guests’ side, gift and labor assistance provided by guests contributes to the 
organization of ceremonies, which might help strengthen social cohesion and offer 
entertainment. Why household ceremonies, embodying these features of public good, 
do not suffer from under-provision? The nature of gifts flow from guests to hosts in a 
private but publicly observable manner, rather than directly shared among the public, 
may well explain its social status motive as gift givers’ welfare does not only depend on 
how much they send but how much more the others send. 
The motive to enlarge social network also explains heavy investment in seemingly 
unproductive activities in terms of costly gifts and lavish ceremonies. However, unlike 
public ceremonies in India that people contribute in absolutely observable manner and 
no specific targeted recipient, whether household ceremonies still carry the function of 
widening social connections deserves our attention.        
To summarize, private returns to social spending might be divided into five 
categories: return to social status, extended network, pure entertainment, a more 
                                                 
2 In the Chinese custom, people need to attend funerals in their relatives’ and friends’ family even without 
any prior invitation from the hosts, while people attend wedding ceremonies conditional on invitation.   - 5 - 
harmonious society, and nutritional improvement. Firstly, social status has its own value, 
which leads to high competition; secondly, the resulting extended networks serve as an 
informal insurance against risks and sources for information exchange; third, pure 
consumption purpose provides a way to entertain; further, household ceremonies might 
enhance social cohesion and protect social security; last but not least, frequent feast 
holding might alleviate people from malnutrition in the area without easy access to 
water and road. Concerning private investment in public goods, there is potentially a 
free rider problem at least for the third through fifth returns. However, participants 
voluntarily contribute to the realization of household ceremonies, which might be due 
to the quest for social status and strengthening informal networks to cope with credit 
shortage and asymmetric information. Whether these two potential private returns 
exist will be separately tested in this study. Meanwhile, whether nutritional conditions 
are significantly improved due to ceremonies will be addressed in our future research. 
The initial empirical results show that in almost all specifications social spending 
has significant private returns, while the returns are unanimously biased towards richer 
household. We also find that social connections are more accurately characterized when 
weighted by their intensities (gift values), capturing their role in mobilizing scarce 
resource in the network, while both centrality based on existence of links or social 
capital measure based on memberships are biased or may not be identified. To explore 
the welfare effect of social status and network towards consumption, we test two 
consumption concepts: living expenses and food consumption. Our empirical findings do 
not suggest that social status and network are vehicles through which we could facilitate 
smoother consumption against shocks, though they may change long-term income 
trajectory and the resulted consumption. 
The structure of the paper is as follows: section 2 documents diversified household 
ceremonies prevalent in rural Guizhou and China, to a large extent; section 3 describes 
our dataset; section 4 specifies the model, key variables and identification strategy; 
section 5 presents the empirical results; section 6 concludes. 
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2. Household Ceremonies in Rural Guizhou 
I was deeply impressed with the scene when I was collecting social network data in 
an average village in Guizhou province, and there happened to be a wedding ceremony 
in a nearby village. Both the two villages are still listed as poor villages, where the 
average living standard is below the poverty line released by the provincial government. 
Many families still live in houses that leak water in the rainy season. Lots of elderly still 
need to share their living space with their livestock.  
When our team arrived at the entrance to the village, it seemed to us that the 
whole village had been turned into a kindergarten in which kids were chasing and yelling 
without any adults following aside. I asked some elder kids and was told that their 
parents were assisting a wedding preparation in another village. At that moment, I did 
not believe a ceremony in another village could even stem me from collecting social 
network data from all households in this village. I was then proved to be too optimistic 
after going through households one by one, in front of which came out children telling 
us again that their parents were in another village. 
Disappointment in our face, we accidentally ran into a man when we were about to 
give up. He was dressed in a brand new fur coat, wearing new Nike sport shoes. He told 
us that he was rushing to help the family organizing a wedding ceremony, as all other 
fellow residents have gone there. We were so curious and asked him why kids were left 
at home. He replied that naughty kids sometimes distract their parents from assisting 
ceremony preparation, so it is better to leave them at home finishing homework before 
the ceremony. Meanwhile, as a rule of thumb bringing kids to banquets usually means 
higher cash gift to the host, that is why a few really poor families do not bring kids with 
them. Before leaving, He also reminded us to come at least two days later. He warned 
us that day was the first day of a four-day wedding ceremony (called Jing Jiu), and it was 
scheduled to honor the bride’s and groom’s parents. The next day would be the formal 
ceremony (called Zheng Jiu). On the third day the host would hold ceremony to 
persuade guests to stay (called Liu Ke Jiu). Finally, on the fourth day the host would hold 
a banquet to thank all people who helped and see them off. In a regular wedding   - 7 - 
ceremony, each guest usually offers gift for once but stays to eat for three days. People 
who assist organization usually stay to eat for four days. 
Showing our sincere interest in experiencing local culture, the man kindly invited us 
to go with him and assured us other guests would feel very happy upon our arrival. In 
that evening, we witnessed a sumptuous feast and a three-session Zheng Jiu with 70 
tables of guests. Remember, that feast was only one among several in four days, which 
in total would account for 160 tables. In the ten following days, our data collection 
schedule was altered by another two ceremonies, one come-of-age ceremony and 
another wedding ceremony. 
This is only an epitome among thousands of ceremonies in Guizhou and all over 
China. Guizhou province is populated with more than 20 ethnic minorities, each of 
which has its unique social occasions. In our surveyed region, for example, Han and 
Miao groups celebrate come-of-age, and they invite a Taoist to the ceremony. It also 
reflects their beliefs in Taoism, which is embedded in their culture. In the Buyi village, 
people celebrate Halloween and Christmas, and ceremonies are often held in catholic 
churches near the county seat. Besides their unique social occasions, common 
celebrations are more frequently held across those villages of different ethnic identities, 
such as male members’ wedding, female members’ wedding, house-building, funeral, 
child birth, and house-moving. 
To celebrate those occasions, kitchen ware and tables are borrowed from the 
collective with cash rent. Ceremonies are often located in the backyards of the hosts, 
and formal ceremonies are held in several repeated sessions due to space limitation. 
Relatives, friends, and neighbors usually come to help two days before the start of 
formal ceremonies, which is especially seen in funeral, wedding ceremonies and house-
moving. The arrival of relatives, friends, and neighbors to assist hosts in preparation 
marks the start of ceremonies and abundant food offerings. This is why a funeral is 
usually held for at least five days and a wedding is celebrated for four days. 
Besides reciprocal assistance, cash is the most common gift people send to each 
other as the local custom evolves. The relative share of rural incomes allocated to gift-  - 8 - 
giving has increased steadily since de-collectivization (Yan, 1996). This comes out of 
more expensive gifts and more frequent ceremonies. However, people still send in-kind 
gift to each other, especially in remote villages and some special social occasions. In 
wedding ceremonies, besides the usual large expenses on cash gift, people send 
dumplings, pork, wool, woolen blankets, bed sheets, quilts, kitchen supplies, candles, 
wine, basins and pillows to the new couple to symbolize a sweet life or to help purchase 
necessities. During funeral ceremonies, people send less cash but more in-kind gift and 
non-cash help. The in-kind gift includes corn, lamb, pork, woolen blankets, quilts, edible 
oil, wine as well as other sacrificial offerings. In celebrating come-of-age occasion, 
people send rice and children's wear, while in child birth ceremonies people additionally 
give wool, eggs and fruits. When friends and relatives move their houses, furniture, 
stoves and curtain are usually sent as gift. 
The various social ceremonies facilitate social networks, which may be relied upon 
for mutual assistance and financing. The highly-ritualized gift-giving during ceremonies 
compels villagers to follow, which otherwise would undermine the long-term 
reciprocate relationships and bear the risk of shame. Meanwhile, higher price of gift 
than the publicly adopted level would further strengthen relationship and help achieve 
better social status among fellow residents.  
In addition, Local social networks might play a role in improving investments in 
child and adult nutrition. Marginal increases in childhood nutritional investments from a 
low level might provide huge gains through health, cognitive function and productivity. 
Social ceremonies reduce the cost of health production through economies of scale. 
Meanwhile, the benefits from nutritional improvement are uncertain and reflected in 
the future, the network and resulted ceremonies might overcome the time-inconsistent 
preference in childhood nutritional investment.  
However, the impact of ceremonies on academic performance through health, 
cognitive function and productivity is likely to be mitigated by children’s distraction from 
learning amid frequent ceremonies. We observed in the field that more and larger sizes 
of ceremonies called for substantial help from parents, whose children were left   - 9 - 




To improve upon the prior research, this study is mainly based on three waves of 
household level census panel data of 18 villages between 2004 and 2009 in rural 
Guizhou, China. In the first wave in 2005, all 805 households in three administrative 
villages were administered. The survey collects detailed information on household 
demographics, income, consumption, transfers, expenditures and incomes related to 
gift-giving and different social occasions. Most information is collected for each 
household member. The second wave survey of the same households was administered 
in early 2007 and 833 households were included. In early 2010, the third wave survey 
was conducted. In this latest wave, besides different measures of social capital and 
cohesion, ceremony expenditures and social status from the 18-village census survey, 
we collected data on individual level health and nutritional intake from 9 villages as well 
as household level gift exchange data for all major social occasions from 3 villages. Math 
and Chinese language grades in the recent semester for all children in primary school in 
18 villages were also collected in order to study the impact of social occasion 
participation on learning. These data sources complement each other in exploring 
private returns to social spending. 
Some villages interviewed are only 3 miles away from the county seat, while others 
are more than 10 miles away. The local Karst land form makes geographic conditions 
complex among local villages even if their distances to the county seat are similar. 
Among the 18 villages, 11 villages are populated with Han group, 6 are Miao villages, 
and one is Buyi villages. The Han villages hold a few households from Buyi, Miao, Yi, and 
Dong background. The local Han villages believe in Taoism, and the Buyi village believes 
in Catholicism, while the Miao villages are less salient in beliefs comparing the former 
two groups. The organizations of different types of social occasions in these 
communities provide us with an in-depth view of ceremony behavior. It allows a   - 10 - 
comparison of this social behavior in communities of diversified ethnic group 
compositions and Religions. 
In the 18 villages (equivalent to three administrative villages, Table 1) ceremonies 
are financed based on gift received. Though gifts usually are able to cover organizing 
costs of one’s own ceremony, they fail to pay back when other households host 
ceremonies in a longer term. We try to understand what is missing when we treat social 
spending in household ceremonies solely as a provision of public goods to the 
impoverished households, which helps answer the question why these poor households 
devote so much resource to the celebration. 
 
4. Model 
4.1 Variables and Model Specification 
To understand private returns to social spending, we first set up a household utility 
maximization problem, 
 
                                                       
s.t.  i ii x ps Y +⋅=  
                                                              (, ) i ii r rs X =  
                                                       1
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where i x  denotes household consumption of socially non-sensitive good, while  i s  
denotes individual i’s spending on socially sensitive good.  i S−  is the others’ total social 
spending, which is exogenous. That is,  i s is i’s contribution to the public good (social 
occasions). 
The above problem is equivalent to 
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where the first order condition leads to a reduced form of social spending in the first 
stage estimation. 
(,) i i ii s sS X − =  
i X  denotes a vector of covariates that independently influence household i’s social 
spending and private returns. In the model, the following variables are included. 
(1) Household head age. Household head of older age tends to show more power 
and prestige and is more likely to be respected in the community, which might lead to 
higher level social spending (contribution to the ceremonies) and higher private return. 
However, household head of older age may also be inactive in household ceremonies, 
since they have expectation that their gift expenditure have little chance to be paid back. 
(2) Share of the elderly in a family. If household head age only captures respect 
received in a community, share of the elderly in a family is included to indicate 
inactiveness of a household in ceremonies. 
(3) Household head education. The educated are more likely to be informed and 
make more efficient use of public services and social network. Therefore, they might 
take more advantage of ceremony by investing more. 
(4) Share of youth in the family. This indicator shows activeness of a family in 
ceremonies. The higher share of youth in the family, the more chance that a family will 
be organizing ceremonies, such as wedding, house moving, child birth. This expectation 
usually leads a family to actively participate in the others’ ceremonies.  
(5) Share of children in a family. This indicates household burden in raising children 
up. The higher share of children in a family is expected to be less active in ceremonies. 
(6) Household income. A richer household may spend more in ceremonies simply 
because they afford it. A richer household may also be valued because he/she can 
provide financial resource to the fellow residents in need. 
(7) Minority identities. Minority status may define different culture in celebrations. 
In the field, we observed that ethnic minorities are inactive in participating ceremonies 
in the major Han group as well as their own groups.   - 12 - 
(8) Village dummy. Private returns may also vary by village, which is not able to be 
captured by factors other than village identities. 
However, since both private returns  i r  and household social spending  i s  are 
arguments in the utility function, they may be simultaneously determined. We utilize 
instrument Z  to mitigate simultaneity in the first stage. The first stage of the estimation 
becomes 
( , ,) i i ii s sS XZ − =  
where Z  is used to instrument household i’s social spending and / or its interaction 
with income. In different scenarios, I will use the following instruments: (1) Frequency of 
family member deaths, livestock deaths and natural disasters in each village in the past 
two years; (2) Median level of gift spending in the villages in 2004, 2006 and 2009 (only 
in some scenarios); (3) Share of the elderly in the family. 
In the second stage estimation, we estimate the private return equation and 
emphasize the coefficient and significance of  i s . 
(, ) i ii r rs X =  
where  i r  denotes returns to social spending, such as social status, size of network, pure 
entertainment purpose, nutritional improvement and so on. To measure these private 
returns, some key indicators will be considered. 
(1)  How to deal with cash shortage? It can reflect a household’s social status and 
network, since cash is a scarce resource in the local context. In the questionnaire we 
asked respondents in which month of a year they feel short of cash the most. In the 
multiple choice question options include selling household properties, doing odd jobs, 
borrowing from relatives, friends or neighbors, relying on usury, selling blood, living 
frugally and drawing bank deposits. Most households in 18 villages do not have much 
banking deposits that could smooth their consumption and production in that month. If 
respondents choose the option borrowing from relatives or neighbors as one answer, 
there is a dummy variable valued 1. Otherwise, it is valued 0. In this context, the richest 
people may still have the potential to not choose that option but drawing bank deposit.   - 13 - 
However, suppose we find that richer households are no less relying on borrowing from 
relatives or neighbors, the bias should not affect our result. 
(2) Frequency of get-together with relatives, friends and neighbors. This indicator is 
defined to include dinner party, drinking, and other entertaining activities. Though these 
activities are usually of smaller scale, it facilitates mutual exchange of needed resource 
(especially in the local dry season every year), strengthens local cohesion, and reflects 
the closeness a household possesses with other fellow residents. 
(3) Subjective evaluation of social status in the village. In the questionnaire we 
included a measure of social status by categorizing their subjective evaluation into five: 
very high, high, moderate, low and very low. Only 2.5% of respondents answered don’t 
know. Under the assumption that this variable is an indicator of a latent measure of 




A problem in specifying a model of social influence on behavior has to do with 
proper identification of the specified relationships, meaning that the parameters of the 
model are uniquely determined by a dataset. The identification problem in social 
influence arises since behavior is determined by behavior, which brings a circularity of 
cause and effect (Manski, 1993; Manski, 2000).  
In our first stage estimation of returns to social spending, social spending is 
indicated by total gifts (including in-kind goods and cash) send to hosts in ceremonies. 
Gift-giving behavior of a household is a linear function of the average level of gift-giving 
by other households in the cohort. Suppose that a household i has relevant 
characteristics i x , and other households in the cohort have similar attributes. The gift-
giving behavior of household i is determined by what the peers do. The econometric 
specification is the following, 
12 [|] i ii i i y a bE y x bx ε = + ++ 
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Plug into the econometric specification, we can estimate  1 /(1 ) ab −  and  21 /(1 ) bb − , but 
we cannot separately identify parameters a,  1 b  and  2 b . Adding in more variables does 
not help, since more variables bring more parameters to identify. As Manski (1993, 2000) 
points out, instrumental variables might be able to resolve the problem, since part of 











The reflection problem stems from the fact that household i’s peers are not 
identified directly but assumed to be similar to i. However, unique to social network 
studies, information on social structure can help identify those parameters. Specifically, 
if we explicitly track i’s peers, then that information can be used to identify a model 
(Anselin, Florax and Rey, 2004). Jackson (2008) formulates the following linear 
interaction of behaviors and ignores constant terms and node-specific characteristics. 
i ij j i
j
y gy ασ ε = + ∑  
where each individual’s behavior is a weighted average of peers’ behavior.  ij g  is a entry 
in the adjacency matrix G denoting whether there is a link between household i and j. If 
() IG ασ −  is invertible, then 
1 () YI G ασ ε
− = −  
where y and ε  are the corresponding vectors. We can identify ασ  if we have 
knowledge of the adjacency matrix and the covariance matrix of the error term []
T E εε . 
Here the critical precondition for identification is that the adjacency matrix is 
asymmetric, i.e. a link from i to j does not necessarily mean a link from j to i.  
In the empirical tests, Bonacich Centrality (1987) is used to compare the results 
with IV estimation, and its vector is defined as   - 15 - 
1 [] C I GJ ασ
− = −  
where I  is a NxN identity matrix, and J  is a Nx1 column vector of ones. An adjacent 
NxN matrix of 1 and 0 denotes direct connections between each pair of agents. 
Meanwhile, the matrix is asymmetric that a link from i to j has different meaning than 
the link from j to i. The terms in the diagonal are all assumed to be zero. 
The classical centrality index includes information on connections but not intensity 
of those connections.
3 However, intensity weighted centrality can be calculated based 
on a modification of the algorithm. In the results, two centrality measures and their 
impacts on private returns will be compared. Meanwhile, household maximization 
problem with socially sensitive goods together with market clearance of those goods 
lead to their allocation based on relative location in the network (Chen, 2010). 
Therefore, in the empirical tests followed by, relative centrality measures will be 
adopted. Since we only have extensive social link data for three out of eighteen villages 
surveyed, we have to narrow down our dataset when replacing the predictor variable 
per capita gift spending by relative centrality. 
 
4.3 Intermediate Private Returns, Shocks and Consumption Smoothing 
Private returns to social spending, such as enlarged social network (measured by 
frequency of get-together and capability to borrow from others), should be 
intermediate resources through which households cope with shocks. We are curious 
about whether these resources really serve as an informal insurance against shocks. I 
suspect that better market access might lead to lower reliance on intermediate 
resources through the following channels: access to formal financial sector, more job 
opportunities and diversified income sources, and massive labor flow which reduces 
local social interactions. However, the surveyed villages in Guizhou vary widely in 
market access amid uneven economic growth, which makes it theoretically 
undetermined but empirically testable. The following model is specified, where  ij PC  
                                                 
3 Put another way, the major difference between household centrality and social spending is that the 
former measure contains partial information on investing in household ceremonies.   - 16 - 
denotes per capita living expenses or per capital food consumption. Shocks are first 
measured by (more or less homogeneous) natural disasters and then are extended to 
more idiosyncratic events, such as family member death and livestock death, to 
compare results.
4 
, 0 1 ,2 ,3 , ,4 ,5 , () * iv iv iv iv iv iv v iv LnPC Shock IR Shock IR X W ββ β β β β ε ∆ = + + + + ++ 
, iv IR  denotes intermediate returns  we tested before, such as frequency of get-
together and capability to borrow  from  friends, relatives and neighbors.  These 
intermediate returns reflect  trust, involvement and mutual assistance among local 
residents, and they also enable us to test different roles in mitigating shocks. We focus 
on the interactive term between shocks and intermediate returns, i.e.  ,, * iv iv Shock IR . If 
intermediate returns help household cope with shocks, we expect a positive sign for 3 β , 
otherwise  3 β  should not be significantly different from 0. 
 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1 Determinants of Household Level Social Spending 
Table 6 estimates determinants of social spending in 2006. Villages which have 
richer culture / atmosphere in spending lavishly on gifts and ceremonies tend to push 
their members to significantly spend more. Richer households significantly spend more 
on social occasions, while households with higher share of the elderly and ethnic 
minority families are less active in social spending. The insignificant impact of share of 
youth within a family is out of our expectation. Households in Village 3, which is much 
closer to the county seat, saliently spend more on social occasions. The exogenous 
shock, frequency of family member deaths, livestock deaths and natural disasters in the 
past two years, positively influences household social spending. Table 7 is another first 
stage estimation for 2009. The differences between 2006 and 2009 include the 
insignificant impact of share of the elderly and minority identity and the significance of 
share of youth in 2009. 
                                                 
4 Kernel Densities for shocks of different degrees of homogeneity are compared (Figure 3). Among them, 
natural disaster is the most homogeneous shock.   - 17 - 
 
5.2 Return to Social Status 
In the third wave we include subjective evaluation of social status for each household, 
and it is categorized into three levels (1=below average, 2=on average, 3=above 
average). Table 8 estimates the impact of social spending on this subjective social 
ranking. Evidence shows the more educated tend to rank themselves higher, while per 
capita income does not show any significance. In more unequal natural villages people 
are less self-confident and rank themselves lower. Most importantly, social spending has 
positively significant impact on subjective ranking, and the impact is especially biased 
towards the rich households. The results support our expectation that social spending 
brings return to social status. On the median level of income a 100 yuan increase in per 
capita social spending brings 0.5 standard deviation rise in subjective ranking. 
 
5.3 Return to Social Networks 
Table 9 presents evidence on the effect of social spending on capability to borrow 
from relatives, friends and neighbors using 2006 survey data. Household social spending 
is first instrumented by frequency of shocks in the village in the recent two years. We 
find significant impact of social spending on credit assistance from others when faced 
with cash shortage. A family with higher share of the elderly is usually less likely to rely 
on others to ease cash shortage. 
In the second scenario, we instrument social spending and its interaction with per 
capita income by share of elderly and frequency of shocks. It is found that richer people 
tend not to ask for credit from relatives, friends and neighbors. Social spending still 
significantly contributes to credit assistance at all income level. Most importantly, social 
spending takes more salient effect with families of higher income. Put another way, 
poor households do not benefit as much as rich households from socializing. 
Scenarios 3 and 4 further presents parallel evidence from 2009 survey data. Major 
results follow. Once again, we find significant impact of social spending towards getting   - 18 - 
credit from relatives, friends and neighbors. However, rich households seem to benefit 
more from this channel. 
Table 10 shows significant evidence of the impact of social spending on frequency 
of get-together with fellow residents. Households with educated household head join 
get-together significantly more frequently than others. Across all specifications higher 
social spending leads to significantly more frequent get-together participation, while the 
benefit once again seems to be higher for rich households. 
 
5.4 Strength of Social Connections and Private Returns 
In Table 11 we restrict our analysis to three villages and compare the impact of 
network centrality on frequency of get-together with fellow residents, capability to 
borrow from others and subjective ranking. Two measures of centrality are utilized, one 
is based on existence of links and the other is based on values of gifts. Results show that 
relative centrality based on existence of links does not significantly predict higher social 
status and extended network. Instead, relative centrality incorporating the strength of 
links saliently leads to higher status and larger social network. Thus, social connections 
without high intensity may not be effective in obtaining scarce resource from others. 
This result conveys a message that classical measure of centrality needs to be 
revised to embody information on the strength of the relationships. Membership-based 
social capital measures probably have even worse bias, as they contain even less and 
more inaccurate information on social interactions. Meanwhile, the models in Table 12 
further confirm that households with better educated household head and higher share 
of youth are more likely to have higher status and larger social network. 
 
5.5 Intermediate Private Returns and Consumption Smoothing 
All above measures of social status and network are intermediate, which facilitate 
smoother consumption and (agricultural and non-agricultural) investment. In the last 
estimations, we explore whether social network and social status could help local 
residents smooth consumption amid shocks. Table 12 shows intermediate private   - 19 - 
returns to enlarged social network do not help smooth living expenses or food 
consumption in shocks. However, social network has independent positive effect on 
living expenses or food consumption growth. The result suggests that social capital may 
change long-term income trajectory and the resulted consumption, but it may not 
insure households against shocks and smooth consumption. 
 
6 Conclusions and Discussion 
In this paper, we estimate private returns to gift spending, such as higher social 
status and larger social network that serves as certain functions. In almost all 
specifications we find that gift spending has significant private returns, but the returns 
are unanimously biased towards richer households. This may be explained by increasing 
returns to social network, since the richer households might have connections with 
more rich households which also know more households. To the contrary, this effect is 
limited for poor households.   
Meanwhile, the impacts of network centrality on social network and social status 
differ for two measures of centrality. Relative centrality based on existence of links does 
not significantly predict higher social status and extended network. Instead, relative 
centrality incorporating the strength of links saliently leads to higher status and larger 
social network. Therefore, social connections are more accurately characterized when 
weighted by their intensity, without which we may not be able to effectively capture 
their role in mobilizing scarce resource in the network. 
Social status and network are intermediate and supposed to facilitate smoother 
consumption. However, our findings suggest that they do not significantly help smooth 
living expenses or food consumption after shocks other than their independent positive 
effects on consumption. Social capital may change long-term income trajectory and the 
resulted consumption, but it may not serve as an informal insurance against shocks. 
The next step might be to further our analysis from the perspective of hosting 
ceremonies and study ceremonies of different functions. Meanwhile, whether social 
network alleviates poor households from malnutrition or worsens their nutrition   - 20 - 
conditions through drawing too much resource deserves our attention after the 
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Notes 1) The categorization for rural China (rCHN1, rCHN2, rCHN3, rCHN4) is based on the same criteria as other datasets, i.e. less than $1 per day, $1-$2 per 
day, $4-$6 per day and $6-$10 per day. The poverty lines are adjusted according to 2005 PPP rate from http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/jsp/index.jsp. 
2) Notation: CHN: China, Gua: Guatemala, INDU: India-Udaipur, INDO: Indonesia, INDK: India-Karnataka, COTE: Cote d'Ivoire, MEX: Mexico, NIC: 
Nicaragua, PAK: Pakistan, PAN: Panama, PAPU: Papua New Guinea, SOU: South Africa, INDH: India-Hyderabad. r: rural; u: urban; 1: live with less than $1 
per day; 2: live with less than $2 per day; 3: live with $2-$4 per day; 4: live with $6-$10 per day. 
3) The dashed circle and the arrow show rapid increase in the share of gift and festival expenditure in total consumption.   - 24 - 
Figure 2 Annualized Growth in Per Capita Income, Consumption, and Gift 
Spending by Administrative Village 
 
      Source: Brown, P., E. Bulte, and X. Zhang (2010). 
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Table 1 Summary Statistics by Administrative Village  
 





Village 3  Total 
Number of natural villages  9  5  4  18 
Total number of households  257  151  393  801 
Total population  1,089  535  1,449  3,073 
Distance to the county seat (km)  10.0  8.0  2.5  6.8 
Per capita cultivated land (mu)  0.87  0.86  1.10  0.98 
Share of flat land (%)  40.0  20.7  80.0  53.4 
Male head of household (dummy)  93.5  94.8  91.6  92.8 
Education of household head (years)  2.87  3.06  3.98  3.44 
Minority head of household (dummy)  76.6  12.6  6.7  30.8 
Share of household members aged 11-29, unmarried (%)  15.9  15.7  14.7  16.6 
Share of household members aged 60 and above (%)  14.2  17.9  12.5  14.1 
Source: Authors’ survey data   - 26 - 
Table 2 Income and Consumption by Administrative Village (2004-2009) 
   Admin Village 1  Admin Village 2  Admin  Village 3  Total 
   2004  2006  2009  2004  2006  2009  2004  2006  2009  2004  2006  2009 
Main Sources of Income (Percent)                         
  Farming  26.3  26.7  23.7  31.0  37.4  29.5  37.0  31.5  26.1  33.3  31.4  33.1 
  Livestock  12.3  13.3  13.1  9.1  10.9  10.8  6.0  3.4  2.1  8.1  6.8  6.9 
  Local non-farm and self-employment   18.2  13.8  13.1  6.4  16.7  13.9  32.3  39.9  35.0  24.0  30.0  23.8 
  Remittance from migrants outside the county  7.8  22.4  11.6  10.9  10.2  9.4  7.3  10.7  6.6  8.0  13.1  8.8 
  Disaster relief, anti-poverty programs, deforestation subsidies  5.1  2.9  6.1  2.5  6.9  5.8  1.9  0.5  4.8  2.8  2.0  5.4 
  Gift income  3.2  4.5  4.7  11.7  11.6  8.4  4.9  11.1  10.7  5.6  9.1  8.2 
  Blood donation income  13  4.6  7.2  15.7  1.7  4.7  7.6  0.7  1.6  10.9  2.2  4.1 
                         
Main Expenditures (Percent)                         
  Food  53.8  51.1  48.1  47.1  42.9  36.5  45.4  38.5  34.3  47.8  42.2  35.5 
  Clothing  4.4  4.4  4.6  3.1  3.7  4.1  4.0  4.9  4.1  4.0  4.6  4.2 
  Fuel  5.9  6.4  6.7  5.4  6.9  7.3  10.2  9.5  8.0  8.4  8.3  7.5 
  Telephone  1.1  2.1  5.3  1.3  2.4  3.8  1.5  3.5  6.4  1.4  3.0  5.5 
  Medical care  14.1  16.7  15.1  24.7  16.8  16.9  15.2  15.2  11.2  16.4  15.8  13.5 
  Education  9.0  10.0  9.6  7.9  12.2  14.0  8.8  12.3  14.1  8.7  11.7  12.9 
  Gift and festival spending  6.4  9.2  10.1  6.8  13.9  16.1  8.9  15.9  17.5  7.9  13.9  15.2 
Source: Authors’ survey data 
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Table 3 Gift Expenditure by Administrative Village (2004-2009) 
    Admin Village 1  Admin Village 2  Admin Village 3  Total 
    2004 2006 2009 2004 2006 2009 2004 2006 2009 2004 2006 2009 
Participation rate in gift giving (%)  59.1  85.1  95.0  57  91.8  94.8  66.7  95.4  97.0  62.4  91.2  96.0 
Median per capita gift expenditure (RMB)  16  62.5  125  20  150  200  80  250  571.4 33.3  150  300 
Median gift to direct relatives (RMB per occasion)  30  50    30  50    50  100    40  60   
Median gift to friends/neighbors (RMB per occasion)  10  20  40  15  30  50  25  50  80  20  30  50 
Times of Sending out gift  -  13.6  11.0  -  8.4  13.8  -  11.1  23.1  -  11.4  17.6 
Source: Authors’ survey data 
Table 4 Median Gift Received (RMB) in Different Social Occasions from 1994 to 2009 (per occasion)* 
Year 
 
Wedding: Groom's Family  Wedding: Bride's Family  Funeral   
1st son  2nd son  3rd son  1st daughter  2nd daughter  3rd daughter  1st  2nd 
1996  900  -  -  1000  -  -  500  - 
1997  500  0  -  1000  -  -  1200  - 
1998  0  0  -  0  -  -  1500  0 
1999  0  0  0  0  -  -  1500  - 
2000  0  -  -  0  -  -  2250  1600 
2001  2500  1150  -  150  -  -  1200  - 
2002  850  0  -  400  900  -  2000  1000 
2003  2250  0  4050  240  -  -  2000  1200 
2004  2100  2800  -  -  -  -  2200  2000 
2005  1200  -  -  0  -  -  2000  - 
2006  4800  -  -  3500  1250  -  1850  5000 
* In other social occasions such as big diseases, natural disasters, and college entrances more and more local residents exchange gifts.  
The information is collected by the authors according to household gift-receiving records.   - 28 - 
Table 5 Median Marriage and funeral Expenditures (RMB) (1996-2009) 
Year  Wedding: Groom's Family  Wedding: Bride's Family  Funeral 
    Brideprice  Gift to bride  Ceremony  Total Expenditure  Dowry  Ceremony  Total Expenditure  Total Expenditure 
1996  2500  2000  2000  6500  0  1000  1000  1750 
1997  3000  1800  2000  6800  1000  0  1000  3000 
1998  3500  2000  2250  7750  1100  500  1600  3000 
1999  2000  1800  2000  5800  300  0  300  3200 
2000  3000  2000  2500  7500  2000  150  2150  3000 
2001  3000  3000  3000  9000  2000  0  2000  3000 
2002  4800  4250  2400  11450  400  0  400  2850 
2003  3000  3500  3000  9500  1900  500  2400  3850 
2004  8000  2500  3500  14000  -**  -**  -**  6000 
2005  9500  5250  3700  18450  2000  0  2000  5000 
2006  8800  5600  3750  18150  2250  3500  5750  5000 
2007  1000  10750  5500  17250  2000  4000  6000  7100 
2008  1000  12000  6500  19500  2000  4000  6000  9180 
2009  1000  12000  6200  19200  1600  4000  5600  7400 
Source: Authors’ survey data 
* Using Recall data from the 2007 survey and 2009 survey. 
** No wedding was held for that category during that year.  
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Table 6 Determinants of Social Spending in 2006 (1
st stage estimation) 
  I(a)  I(b)  I(c) 
  Gift expenditure per capita (2006) 
Share of Youth  96.484  99.748  107.341 
(77.76)  (77.89)  (78.20) 
Education  3.925  4.026  5.955 
(4.34)  (4.37)  (4.32) 
Per Capita Income (log)  58.119***  58.400***  66.951*** 
(16.56)  (16.63)  (16.46) 
Sex  -66.974  -72.264  -75.934 
(58.34)  (58.31)  (58.66) 
Marriage Status  11.134  16.775  23.511 
(74.02)  (73.97)  (74.33) 
Minority  -109.517***  -138.974***  -169.570*** 
(38.66)  (31.12)  (28.94) 
Gini Coefficient  419.097*  205.546  342.11 
(222.66)  (221.49)  (222.79) 
Share of the Elderly  -131.731***  -132.383***  -129.190*** 
(45.97)  (45.71)  (45.97) 
Lagged Median Gift Expenditure in the Village    1.304***   
  (0.39)   
Frequency of Shocks in the Last Two Years      4.521*** 
    (1.49) 
Observations  694  694  694 
R-squared  0.15  0.15  0.14 
1. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
2. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
3. Village dummies, migration share, household size and cadres are controlled but not reported here. 
4. The exogenous shocks include family member deaths, livestock deaths and natural disasters in the past two years in the village.   - 30 - 
Table 7 Determinant of Social Spending in 2009 (1
st stage estimation) 
  I(d)  I(e) 
  Gift expenditure per capita (2009) 
Share of Youth  431.716***  457.671*** 
  (152.29)  (150.37) 
Education  13.402  7.651 
  (11.90)  (11.83) 
Per Capita Income (log)  250.398***  224.332*** 
  (38.57)  (38.65) 
Sex  -38.937  8.162 
  (151.45)  (149.90) 
Minority  272.501***  17.987 
  (78.45)  (101.98) 
Marriage Status  -135.7077  -129.7836 
  (136.861)  (135.0214) 
Gini Coefficient  -1,313.640*  -347.698 
  (747.70)  (779.45) 
Share of the Elderly  -43.233  -36.734 
  (147.21)  (145.23) 
Frequency of Shocks in the Last Two Years 
  2.956*** 
  (0.46) 
Observations  502  502 
R-squared  0.17  0.19 
1. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
2. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
3. Village dummies, migration share, household size and cadres are controlled but not reported here. 
4. The exogenous shocks include family member deaths, livestock deaths and natural disasters in the past two 
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Table 8 Ordered Probit Estimation of Private Return to Social Spending (2009) 
(Measuring Return to Social Status via Subjective Ranking) 
 
  II(a)  II(b) 
  Subjective Ranking (2009) 
Share of Youth  0.2  0.091 
  (0.33)  (0.30) 
Education  0.040**  0.039** 
  (0.02)  (0.02) 
Per Capita Income (log)  0.08  -0.240* 
  (0.12)  (0.13) 
Sex  -0.151  -0.084 
  (0.25)  (0.21) 
Marriage Status  -0.208  -0.244 
  (0.26)  (0.26) 
Minority  -0.035  0.084 
  (0.31)  (0.20) 
Gini Coefficient  -2.118**  -2.499*** 
  (0.90)  (0.84) 
Gift expenditure per capita (predicted)  0.003**  -0.003 
(0.00)  (0.00) 
Gift expenditure per capita (predicted)* per capita 
Income (log) 
  0.001*** 
  (0.00)  
Observations  694  694 
1. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
2. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 9 Private Return to Social Spending 
(Measuring Return to Social Network via Solving Cash Shortage) 
 
  II(c)  II(d)  II(e)  II(f) 
 
Whether could borrow from relatives, friends and neighbors 
(2006)  (2009) 
Share of Youth  -0.021  -0.393  0.204  0.259 
  (0.38)  (0.34)  (0.32)  (0.32) 
Education  0.011  -0.007  0.021  0.026 
  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
Marriage Status  0.361  0.301  0.225  0.292 
  (0.33)  (0.33)  (0.24)  (0.24) 
Per Capita Income (log)  -0.007  -0.373***  -0.171  -0.342** 
  (0.14)  (0.13)  (0.13)  (0.15) 
Sex  -0.019  0.368  0.085  0.098 
  (0.29)  (0.25)  (0.27)  (0.26) 
Minority  -0.198  0.461**  0.359**  0.333* 
  (0.35)  (0.22)  (0.18)  (0.18) 
Gini Coefficient  0.985  -0.081  -1.525  -1.323 
  (1.04)  (0.96)  (1.34)  (1.34) 
Gift expenditure per capita (predicted)  0.003*  0.002  0.001  -0.002** 
(0.00)  (0.00)   (0.00)  (0.00) 
Gift expenditure per capita (predicted)* per capita 
Income (log) 
  0.00***    0.00** 
  (0.00)    (0.00) 
Observations  694  694  510  510 
1. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
2. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
3. Village dummies, migration share, household size and cadres are controlled but not reported here.   - 33 - 
Table 10 Private Return to Social Spending (2009) 
(Measuring Return to Social Network via Get-together Frequency) 
 
  II(g)  II(h)  II(h’) 
  Frequency of Get-together (2009) 
Share of Youth  -0.446  -0.304  -0.304 
  (0.92)  (0.91)  (0.91) 
Sex  -0.956  -0.925  -0.925 
  (0.80)  (0.78)  (0.78) 
Minority  0.183  0.178  0.178 
  (0.51)  (0.50)  (0.50) 
Education  0.237***  0.245***  0.245*** 
  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.07) 
Per Capita Income (log)  -0.587  -1.029**  -1.029** 
  (0.40)  (0.43)  (0.43) 
Gini Coefficient  -3.93  -3.626  -3.626 
  (2.93)  (2.99)  (2.99) 
Gift expenditure per capita (predicted) 
0.005***  -0.001  0.005*** 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Gift expenditure per capita (predicted)* Per Capita Income(log) 
  0.001**   
  (0.00)   
Gift expenditure per capita (predicted)* (per capita inc – mean(per capita inc)) 
    0.001** 
    (0.00) 
Observations  509  509  509 
R-squared  0.16  0.17  0.17 
1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
2. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
3. Village dummies, migration share, household size and cadres are controlled but not reported here. 
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Table 11 Private Return to Network Connections (Centrality) (2009) 
   II(i)  II(j)  II(k)  II(l)  II(m)  II(n) 
  
Frequency of Get-together 
(2009) 
Capability to borrow 
from relatives, friends 
and neighbors 
Subjective Ranking 
Share of Youth 
3.527***  3.338***  0.728**  0.674**  5.629***  5.811*** 
(1.24)  (1.22)  (0.34)  (0.34)  (1.42)  (1.46) 
Education 
0.393***  0.385***  -0.024  -0.027  0.221***  0.277*** 
(0.13)  (0.13)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.07)  (0.09) 
Marriage Status 
-0.299  -0.498  0.319  0.277  -0.718  -1.002* 
(1.04)  (1.02)  (0.39)  (0.39)  (0.51)  (0.52) 
Per Capita Income (log) 
0.299  0.244  -0.082  -0.098  17.005***  17.948*** 
(0.33)  (0.33)  (0.08)  (0.08)  (2.31)  (2.61) 
Sex 
1.031  0.956  -0.247  -0.28  2.417***  2.312*** 
(0.89)  (0.88)  (0.31)  (0.32)  (0.48)  (0.48) 
Minority  -1.260*  -1.421**  0.457**  0.400**  -0.478  0.033 
(0.67)  (0.67)  (0.20)  (0.20)  (0.48)  (0.56) 
Age 
-0.016  -0.02  -0.021***  -0.023***  0.02  0.03 
(0.03)  (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
Gini Coefficient  -24.127**  -21.144*  0.174  1.101  -27.555***  -25.038** 
(11.38)  (11.12)  (3.33)  (3.38)  (9.81)  (9.99) 
Relative centrality 
(existence of links) 
0.499    0.138    0.559*   
(0.70)    (0.16)    (0.32)   
Relative centrality (weighted by 
values of gifts) 
  0.383**    0.142**    0.477** 
  (0.16)    (0.06)    (0.23) 
Observations  336  336  336  336  284  284 
1. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
2. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
3. Village dummies, migration share, household size and cadres are controlled but not reported here. 
4. Tobit model for the first two columns, probit model for the next two columns, and ordered probit models for the last two columns are 
estimated respectively. 
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Table 12 Intermediate Private Returns, Shocks and Consumption 







































-0.059  -0.063          0.065  -0.036         
(0.18)  (0.15)          (0.20)  (0.18)         
Natural Disaster 
    -0.148  -0.028          0.201  0.312***     
    (0.13)  (0.10)          (0.13)  (0.12)     
Livestock Death 
        -0.013  -0.023          0.1  0.071 
        (0.16)  (0.13)          (0.21)  (0.19) 
Death * Capability to 
Borrow 
-0.236  -0.063                     
(0.28)  (0.27)                     
Disaster * Capability to 
Borrow 
    -0.101  -0.035                 
    (0.17)  (0.14)                 
Livestock Death * 
Capability to Borrow 
        0.082  -0.007             
        (0.25)  (0.24)             
Death * Frequency of 
Get-together 
            -0.030*  -0.017         
            (0.02)  (0.02)         
Disaster * Frequency of 
Get-together 
                -0.053**  -0.06***     
                (0.02)  (0.02)     
Lvkdeath * Frequency of 
Get-together 
                    0  -0.004 
                    (0.03)  (0.02) 
Capability to Borrow 
0.216***  0.153**  0.269***  0.158*  0.187**  0.147*             
(0.08)  (0.08)  (0.09)  (0.10)  (0.08)  (0.08)             
Frequency of Get-
together 
            0.025***  0.032***  0.029***  0.039***  0.019**  0.029*** 
            (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)   - 36 - 
Obs  373  373  377  377  373  373  311  311  311  311  311  311 
R2  0.21  0.22  0.21  0.21  0.21  0.21  0.21  0.25  0.22  0.27  0.2  0.25 
1. Robust standard errors in parentheses   
2. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
3. Village dummies, per capita income (log), share of youth, household head information (education, age, gender and minority status), migration share, and cadre are controlled but not 
reported here. 
4. In the odd columns of estimations dependent variables are all defined as difference in logged living expenses between 2004 and 2006, while in the even columns of estimations dependent 
variables are all defined as difference in logged food consumption between 2004 and 2006. 
 